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Abstract. Adversarial examples are inputs with imperceptible perturbations that
easily misleading deep neural networks (DNNs). Recently, adversarial patch,
with noise confined to a small and localized patch, has emerged for its easy fea-
sibility in real-world scenarios. However, existing strategies failed to generate
adversarial patches with strong generalization ability. In other words, the adver-
sarial patches were input-specific and failed to attack images from all classes, es-
pecially unseen ones during training. To address the problem, this paper proposes
a bias-based framework to generate class-agnostic universal adversarial patches
with strong generalization ability, which exploits both the perceptual and seman-
tic bias of models. Regarding the perceptual bias, since DNNs are strongly biased
towards textures, we exploit the hard examples which convey strong model un-
certainties and extract a textural patch prior from them by adopting the style sim-
ilarities. The patch prior is more close to decision boundaries and would promote
attacks. To further alleviate the heavy dependency on large amounts of data in
training universal attacks, we further exploit the semantic bias. As the class-wise
preference, prototypes are introduced and pursued by maximizing the multi-class
margin to help universal training. Taking Automatic Check-out (ACO) as the
typical scenario, extensive experiments including white-box/black-box settings
in both digital-world (RPC, the largest ACO related dataset) and physical-world
scenario (Taobao and JD, the worlds largest online shopping platforms) are con-
ducted. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed framework outper-
forms state-of-the-art adversarial patch attack methods.
Keywords: Universal Adversarial Patch, Automatic Check-out, Bias-based
1 Introduction
Deep learning has demonstrated remarkable performance in a wide spectrum of areas,
including computer vision [11], speech recognition [16] and natural language process-
ing [23]. Recently, deep learning strategies have been introduced into the check-out
scenario in supermarkets and grocery stores to revolutionize the way people shopping
(e.g., Amazon Go). Automatic Check-Out (ACO) [26,13,3] is a visual item counting
system that takes images of shopping items as input and generates output as a tally of
different categories. Customers are not required to put items on the conveyer belt and
∗ These authors contributed equally to this work.
† Corresponding author.
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2Fig. 1. In the real-world scenario like Automatic Check-Out, items (e.g., fruits and chocolates)
are often tied with patch-like stickers or tags.
wait for salesclerks to scan them. Instead, they can simply collect the chosen items and
a deep learning based visual recognition system will classify them and automatically
process the purchase.
Though showing signicant achievements in our daily lives, unfortunately, deep learn-
ing is vulnerable to adversarial examples [8,24]. These small perturbations are imper-
ceptible to human but easily misleading DNNs, which creates potential security threats
to practical deep learning applications, e.g., auto-driving and face recognition systems
[14]. In the past years, different types of techniques have been developed to attack deep
learning systems [8,24,27]. Though challenging deep learning, adversarial examples are
also valuable for understanding the behaviors of DNNs, which could provide insights
into the blind-spots and help to build robust models [29,28].
Besides the well-designed perturbations, the adversarial patch serves as an alterna-
tive way to generate adversarial examples, which can be directly localized in the input
instance [1,9,14]. In contrast, adversarial patches enjoy the advantages of being input-
independent and scene-independent. In real-world scenarios, patches could be often
observed which are quasi-imperceptible to humans. For example, as shown in Fig.1,
the tags and brand marks on items in the supermarket. Thus, it is convenient for an
adversary to attack a real-world deep learning system by simply generate and stick ad-
versarial patches on the items. However, existing strategies [1,5] generate adversarial
patches with weak generalization abilities and are not able to perform universal attacks
[17]. In other words, these adversarial patches are input-specific and fail to attack im-
ages from all classes, especially unseen ones during training.
To address the problem, this paper proposes a bias-based framework to generate
class-agnostic universal adversarial patches with strong generalization ability, which
exploits both the perceptual and semantic bias. Regarding the perceptual bias, since
DNNs are strongly biased towards textural representations and local patches [29,7], we
exploit the hard examples which convey strong model uncertainties and extract a textu-
ral patch prior from them by adopting the style similarities. We believe that the textural
prior is more close to decision boundaries which would promote the universal attack to
different classes. To further alleviate the heavy dependency on large amounts of data
in training universal attacks[19], we further exploit the semantic bias. As models have
preference and bias towards different features for different classes, prototypes, which
contain strong class-wise semantics, are introduced as the class-wise preference and
pursued by maximizing the multi-class margin. We generate prototypes to help uni-
3versal training and reduce the amount of training data required. Extensive experiments
including both the white-box and black-box settings in both the digital-world (RPC, the
largest ACO related dataset) and physical-world scenario (Taobao and JD, the worlds
largest online shopping platforms) are conducted. Experimental results demonstrate that
our proposed framework outperforms state-of-the-art adversarial patch attack methods.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to generate class-agnostic universal
adversarial patches by exploiting the perceptual and semantic biases of models. With
strong generalization ability, our adversarial patches could attack images from unseen
classes of the adversarial patch training process or target models. To validate the ef-
fectiveness, we choose the automatic check-out scenario and successfully attack the
Taobao and JD platform, which are among the world’s largest e-commerce platforms
and the ACO-like scenarios.
2 Related work
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial examples, which are intentionally designed inputs misleading deep neu-
ral networks, have recently attracted research focus [8,24,12]. Szegedy et al. [24] first
introduced adversarial examples and used the L-BFGS method to generate them. By
leveraging the gradients of the target model, Goodfellow et al. [8] proposed the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) which could generate adversarial examples quickly.
To improve the generalization ability to different classes, Moosavi et al. [17] first
proposed an algorithm to compute universal adversarial perturbations for DNNs for
object recognition tasks. Mopuri et al. [18] proposed a data-free objectives to gener-
ate universal adversarial perturbations by maximizing the neuron activation. Further,
Reddy et al. [19] generated data-free universal adversarial perturbations using class
impressions.
Besides, adversarial patch [1], with noise confined to a small and localized patch,
emerged for its easy accessibility in real-world scenarios. Karmon et al. [9] created
adversarial patches using an optimization-based approach with a modified loss function.
In contrast to the prior research, they concentrated on investigating the blind-spots of
state-of-the-art image classifiers. Eykholt et al. [5] adopted the traditional perturbation
techniques to generate attacking noises, which can be mixed into the black and white
stickers to attack the recognition of the stop sign. To improve visual fidelity, Liu et
al. [14] proposed the PS-GAN framework to generate scrawl-like adversarial patches
to fool autonomous-driving systems. Recently, adversarial patches have been used to
attack person detection systems and fool automated surveillance cameras [25].
2.2 Automatic Check-out
The bedrock of an Automatic Check-out system is visual item counting that takes im-
ages of shopping items as input and generates output as a tally of different categories
[26]. However, different from other computer vision tasks such as object detection and
recognition, the training of deep neural networks for visual item counting faces a spe-
cial challenge of domain shift. Wei et al. [26] first tried to solve the problem using the
4data argumentation strategy. To improve the realism of the target images, through a Cy-
cleGAN framework [30], images of collections of objects are generated by overlaying
images of individual objects randomly. Recently, Li et al. [13] developed a data prim-
ing network by collaborative learning to determine the reliability of testing data, which
could be used to guide the training of the visual item tallying network.
3 Proposed Framework
In this section, we will first give the definition of the problem and then elaborate on our
proposed framework.
3.1 Problem Definition
Assuming X ⊆ Rn is the feature space with n the number of features. Supposing (xi
,yi) is the i-th instance in the data with feature vector xi ∈X and yi ∈ Y the correspond-
ing class label. The deep learning classifier attempts to learn a classification function
F : X → Y . Specifically, in this paper we consider the visual recognition problem.
An adversarial patch δ is a localized patch that is trained to fool the target model
F to wrong predictions. Given an benign image x with its ground truth label y, we
form an adversarial example x′ which is composed of the original image x, an additive
adversarial patch δ ∈ Rz and a location mask M ∈ {0,1}n :
x′ = (1−M) x+M  δ, (1)
where  is the element-wise multiplication. Simply, we will use the below equation:
x′ = x+ δ. (2)
The prediction result of x′δ by model F is y
′ = F (x′δ). The adversarial patch makes the
model predict the incorrect label, namely y′ 6= y.
To perform universal attacks, we generate a universal adversarial patch δ that could
fool the classifier F on items sampled from distribution µ from almost all classes:
F (x) 6= F (x+ δ) for almost all x ∼ µ. (3)
3.2 The Framework
We propose a bias-based attack framework to generate universal adversarial patches
with strong generalization ability. The overall framework can be found in Fig.2.
Recent studies have revealed that DNNs are strongly biased towards texture fea-
tures when making predictions [7]. Deep learning models are still performing well on
patch-shuffled images where local object textures are not destroyed drastically [29].
Thus, we first exploit the perceptual bias of deep models by generating perceptually
biased priors from multiple hard example set X h= {xhi |i=1, ...r}. Textural features
are extracted by an attention moduleA to fuse a more powerful prior δ∗. We believe the
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Fig. 2. Our bias-based framework to generate universal adversarial patches. We first generate a
perceptually biased prior by fusing textural features from multiple hard examples. Then, we gen-
erate semantically biased prototypes to help training universal adversarial patches with a target
model F
fused prior are more close to decision boundaries of different classes and would boost
universal attacks.
Meanwhile, as models have preferences and impressions for different classes, we
further exploit the semantic bias of models for each class. To alleviate the heavy de-
pendency on a large amount of data suffered to train universal attacks, we generate
semantically biased prototypes to help training. As the class-wise preference, pro-
totypes contain rich semantics for each class. Thus, prototypes are generated by maxi-
mizing the multi-class margin and used to represent instances from each class. Training
with prototypes would reduce the amount of training data required. Thus, we generate
prototypes {I1, I2, ..., In} and use them as training data to learn our final adversarial
patch δadv from δ∗.
3.3 Perceptually Biased Prior Generation
Motivated by the fact that deep learning models are strongly biased towards textural
features, we first proposed to extract textural features as priors. To fully exploit the
statistic uncertainty of models, we borrow textural features from hard examples.
Hard examples appear as instances that are difficult for models to classify correctly.
Techniques like hard example mining are used to improve training [6], in which “hard”
hence informative examples are spotted and mined. Given a hard example xh with
ground truth label y, assuming that yh = F (xh) is the prediction of the model F . The
hard example suffices the constraint that yh 6= y or with relatively low classification
confidence. Obviously, a hard example is an instance lying closely to model decision
boundaries, and are more likely to cross the prediction surfaces. Thus, using the features
from a hard example xh to train adversarial patches is like “standing on the shoulders of
a giant”, which would be beneficial to overcome local-optima and gain strong attacking
abilities.
To further motivate universal attacks, we extract textural features from multiple hard
examples with different labels and fuse them together into a stronger prior. Intuitively,
by studying features from multiple hard examples with different labels, our prior would
6contain more uncertainties for different classes. However, simply learning at pixel-level
makes it difficult to extract and fuse textural features. Thus, we introduce the style loss
which specifically measures the style differences and encourages the reproduction of
texture details:
Ls = Ek
[
G(x∗)−G(xhk)
]
,
Gij(x) =
∑
k
F lik(x) · F ljk(x), (4)
whereG is the Gram matrix of the features extracted from certain layers of the network.
F l·k is the activation of a specific filter at position k in the layer l. x
∗ is the fused
example, and xhk is the hard example where k= 1, 2, ..., r.
Besides, entropy has been widely used to depict the uncertainty of a system or
distribution. To further improve universal attacks to different classes, we introduce the
class-wise uncertainty loss. we increase model prediction uncertainties by minimizing
the negative of entropy. Thus, the fused example would be much closer to decision
boundaries and obtain low confidence for different classes. It can be written as:
Lu = Ei
[
log yh,i
]
, (5)
where yh,i denotes the model confidence of the i-th class with the fused input x∗.
Thus, to fully exploit the perceptual bias, we optimize the fusion loss function Lf
as follows:
Lf = Ls + λ · Lu, (6)
where λ controls the balance between the two terms.
However, the fused example x∗ has a different size with our patches. Thus, an atten-
tion module has been introduced to eliminate redundant pixels and generate a textural
prior δ∗ from the fused example x∗.
δ∗ = A(x∗;F ), (7)
where A(·) is a visual attention module that selects a set of suitable visual pixels from
the fused sample. These pixels contain the highest stimuli towards model predictions
and would be used as textural priors.
Inspired by [20], given a hard example xh, we compute the gradient of normalized
feature maps Z of a specific hidden layer in the model w.r.t. yh. These gradients are
global-average-pooled to get the weight matrix which is a weighted combination of
feature maps to the hard example xh :
aij =
w∑
k=1
∂yh
∂Zkij
Zkij , (8)
where aij represents the weight at position (i, j), Zkij is the pixel value in position
(i, j) of k-th feature map, and w represents the total feature map number. Note that
i ∈ [0, u− 1] and j ∈ [0, v − 1] where u, v are the width and height of Z, respectively.
Then, we can combine the pixels with the highest weight to get our textural prior δ∗.
73.4 Training with Semantically Biased Prototypes
With the textural priors generated at the previous stage, we continue to optimize and
generate our adversarial patch. To generate universal adversarial perturbations, most of
the strategies require a lot of training data [19]. To alleviate the heavy dependency on
large amounts of training data, we further exploit the semantic bias.
Prototype is a kind of “quintessential” observations that best represent and contain
the strongest semantics for clusters or classes in a dataset [10]. Prototypes have pro-
vided quantitative benefits to interpret and improve deep learning models. For example,
“black people” is a representative feature for class basketball and most prototypes
(images) in this class contain at least one black person [22]. Thus, we further exploit the
semantic bias of models (i.e., prototypes)for each class. In this stage, we generate class
prototypes and use them during training to effectively reduce the amount of training
data required.
Thus, inspired by [21], to generate prototypes I representing the semantic prefer-
ence of a model for each class, we maximize the logits of one specific class. Formally,
let St(I) denote the logits of class t, computed by the classification layer of the target
model. By optimizing the MultiMarginLoss, the prototype It of class t is obtained:
It = argmax
x
1
C
∑
c 6=t
max(0,margin− St(x) + Sc(x))p, (9)
where x is the input and satisfies the constraint of an RGB image, C denotes the total
number of classes and margin is a threshold that controls the multi-class margin. In
practice, Adam optimizer is applied to find the optimal prototype of class c with p = 1
and margin = 10.
To generate adversarial patches misleading to deep models, we introduce the ad-
versarial attack loss. Specifically, we push the prediction label y′ of the adversarial
example x′ (i.e., a clean prototype I appended with the adversarial patch δadv) away
from its original prediction label y. Therefore, adversarial attack loss can be defined as:
Lt = EI,δadv [P (c = t|I ′)−max(P (c 6= t|I ′))], (10)
where δadv is the adversarial patch which is initialized as the textural prior δ∗, P (·)
is the prediction of the target model to the input, I ′ is the adversarial example which
is composed of the prototype I and adversarial patch δadv , c means the class, and t
denotes the class label of I .
Moreover, recent studies showed that adversarial examples are ineffective to envi-
ronmental conditions, e.g., different views, illuminations, etc. In the ACO scenario, the
items are often scanned from different views with different lighting conditions, which
would impair the attack ability of our patches. Thus, we further introduce the idea of
expectation of transformations to enhance the attack success rate of our adversarial
patches in different conditions, as shown in the expectation of conditions c in Eqn (10).
In conclusion, we first exploit the perceptual bias of models and extract a textural
prior from hard examples by adopting the style similarities. To further alleviate the
heavy dependency on large amounts of data in training universal attacks, we further
exploit the semantic bias. As the class-wise preference, prototypes are introduced and
8Algorithm 1: Bias-based Universal Adversarial Patch Attack
Input: hard example set X h = {xhi |i = 1, ..., r}, target model F
Output: bias-based patch δadv
Stage1 : Perceptually Biased Prior Generation
initial x∗ by randomly select a hard example from X h;
for the number of fusion epochs do
for m = r/batchsize steps do
sample a minibatch of hard examples from X h;
optimize x∗ to minimize Lf ;
obtain the prior patch δ∗ through attention by Eqn (8);
Stage2: Training with Semantically Biased Prototype
get class prototypes set I = {I1, I2, ...In} by Eqn (9);
for the number of training epochs do
for k = n/batchsize steps do
sample a minibatch of prototypes from I;
optimize the adversarial patch δadv to minimize Lt with prototypes;
pursued by maximizing the multi-class margin. Using the textural prior as initialization,
we train our adversarial patches using the prototypes as training data. The illustration
of our two-staged adversarial patch attack algorithm can be found in Algorithm 1.
4 Experiments
In this section, we will illustrate the attack effectiveness of our proposed method in
different settings in the ACO scenario.
4.1 Dataset and Evaluation Metrics
As for the dataset, we use RPC [26], which is the largest grocery product dataset so far
for the retail ACO task. It contains 200 product categories and 83,739 images, including
53,739 single-product exemplary images. Each image is a particular instance of a type
of product, which is then divided into 17 sub-categories (e.g., puffed food, instant drink,
dessert, gum, milk, personal hygiene, etc.). Note that the single-product images are
taken in an isolated environment and each of them is photographed from four directions
to capture multi-views. Fig.3 shows some images from the RPC dataset.
To evaluate our proposed method, we choose classification accuracy as the metric.
Specifically, we further report top-1, top-3 and top-5 accuracy in our experiments. Note
that the goal of adversarial attacks is compromising the performance of the model, i.e.,
leading to worse values of the evaluation metrics above.
4.2 Experimental Settings
The input image is resized to 512 × 512 and the patch size is fixed at 32 × 32. The
size of patches only accounts for 0.38% of the size of images. To optimize the loss,
9Fig. 3. We show 4 images from the category instant noodles in the RPC dataset.
we use Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.01, a weight decay of 10−4, and a
maximum of 50 epochs. We use 200 hard examples to optimize our fused prior. All of
our code is implemented in Pytorch. The training and inference processes are finished
on an NVIDIA Tesla k80 GPU cluster.
As for the compared methods, we choose the state-of-art adversarial patch attack
methods including AdvPatch [1], RP2 [4], and PSGAN [14]. We follow their imple-
mentations and parameter settings. Similar to [17], we use 50 item samples per class
(10,000 in total) as the training data for the compared methods. We also extract 15 pro-
totypes for each class (3,000 in total) as the training data for our method. With respect
to the models, we follow [13] for the ACO task and use ResNet-152 as the backbone.
To further improve the attack success rate of adversarial patches against different envi-
ronments, we introduce transformations as follows:
- Rotation. The rotation angle is limited in [−30◦, 30◦].
- Distortion. The distortion rate, i.e., the control argument, moves in [0, 0.1].
-Affine Transformation. The affine rate changes between 0 and 4.
4.3 Digital-world Attack
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our generated adversarial patches on the
ACO task in the digital-world in both white-box and black-box settings. We also use a
white patch to test the effectiveness of the adversarial attack (denoted as “White”).
As for the white-box attack, we generate adversarial patches based on a ResNet-152
model and then attack it. As shown in Fig.4(a), our method outperforms other compared
strategies with large margins. In other words, our adversarial patches obtain stronger
attacking abilities with lower classification accuracy contrast to others, i.e., 5.42% to
21.10%, 19.78%, and 38.89% in top-1 accuracy.
As for the black-box attack, we generate adversarial patches based on ResNet-
152, then use them to attack other models with different architectures and unknown
parameters (i.e., VGG-16, AlexNet, and ResNet-101). As illustrated in Table 1, our
generated adversarial patches enjoy stronger attacking abilities in the black-box setting
with lower classification accuracy for different models.
Besides the classification accuracy, Fig.4(b) shows the training process of adversar-
ial patches using different methods. After several training epochs, the attacking perfor-
mance of our generated patches becomes stable and keeps the best among all. However,
the performance of other methods still vibrates sharply. It is mainly due to the weak
10
(a) White-box Attack (b) Training Process
Fig. 4. (a) shows the White-box attack experiment in the digital-world with ResNet-152. Our
method generates the strongest adversarial patches with the lowest classification accuracy. (b)
denotes the training process of different methods
generalization ability of other methods. Thus, they achieve different accuracy when
attacking different classes showing sharp viberations.
4.4 Real-world Attack
To further validate the practical effectiveness of our generated adversarial patches, a
real-world attack experiment is conducted on several online shopping platforms to sim-
ulate the ACO scenario. We use Taobao () and JD (), which are among the biggest
e-commerce platforms in the world. We take 80 pictures of 4 different real-world prod-
ucts with different environmental conditions (i.e., angles {-30◦, -15◦, 0◦, 15◦, 30◦} and
Table 1. Black-box attack experiment in the digital-world with VGG-16, AlexNet, and ResNet-
101. Our method generates adversarial patches with strong transferability among different models
Model Method top-1 top-3 top-5
VGG-16
AdvPatch 73.82 90.73 94.99
RP2 81.25 94.65 97.10
PSGAN 74.69 91.25 96.12
Ours 73.72 91.53 95.43
AlexNet
AdvPatch 51.11 72.37 79.79
RP2 68.27 86.49 91.08
PSGAN 49.39 72.85 82.94
Ours 31.68 50.92 60.19
ResNet-101
AdvPatch 56.19 80.99 91.52
RP2 73.52 93.75 98.13
PSGAN 51.26 79.22 90.47
Ours 22.24 51.32 60.28
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(a) Taobao (b) JD
Fig. 5. Attack Taobao and JD platform with our adversarial patches. The milk in (a) and the
plastic cup in (b) are recognised as the decorations and the aluminum foil when
we stick our adversarial patches, respectively
distances {0.3m, 0.5m, 0.7m, 1m}). The top-1 classification accuracy of these images
is 100% on Taobao and 95.00% on JD, respectively. Then, we print our adversarial
patches by an HP Color LaserJet Pro MFP M281fdw printer, stick them on the prod-
ucts and take photos with the combination of different distances and angles using a
Canon D60 camera. A significant drop in accuracy on both platforms can be witnessed
with low classification accuracy (i.e., 56.25% on Taobao, 54.68% on JD). The results
demonstrate the strong attacking ability of our adversarial patches in real-world scenar-
ios on practical applications. Visualization results can be found in Fig.5.
4.5 Generalization Ability
In this section, we further evaluate the generalization ability of adversarial patches on
unseen classes. We perform two experiments using the backbone model (ResNet-152),
including attacking unseen item classes of adversarial patch training process and target
models. For attacking unseen classes of the patch training process, we first train patches
on a subset of the dataset, i.e., only images from 100 classes are used w.r.t. 200 classes
(we use prototypes for our method and item images for compared methods). According
to the results in Table 2, our framework generates adversarial patches with strong gen-
eralization ability and outperforms other compared methods with huge margins (i.e.,
7.23% to 40.28%, 31.62%, and 60.87%). Meanwhile, we also tested the generalization
ability on classes that have never been “seen” by the target model. Specifically, we train
our patches on the RPC dataset and test them on the Taobao platform. We select 4 items
and stick adversarial patches on them and take 64 pictures. The categories of the items
are unseen to target models (not in the 200 classes for ResNet-152), but known to the
Taobao platform. Interestingly, after attacks, the top-1 accuracy on Taobao is 64.52%.
Though our patches are not trained to attack some specified classes, they still generalize
well to these unseen classes. Thus, we can draw the conclusion that our framework gen-
erates universal adversarial patches with strong generalization abilities to even unseen
classes.
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Table 2. Attack on unseen classes. Our method generates adversarial patches with the strongest
generalization abilities showing lowest accuracy compared with other methods
Method AdvPatch RP2 PSGAN Ours
top-1 40.28 60.87 31.62 7.23
4.6 Analysis of Textural Priors
Since textural priors have improved universal attacks, a question emerges: “Why and
how the textural priors are beneficial to universal adversarial attacks?” Thus, in this
section, we further study the effectiveness of our textural priors.
Training from Different Priors To demonstrate the effectiveness of our textural pri-
ors, we begin to study by initializing patches through different priors, e.g., white patch,
Gaussian noise, hard example, PD-UA [15], simple fusion, and our textural prior (de-
noted as “ours”). In contrast to our textual prior, we use the same amount of simple
examples to generate the simple version of fused prior (denoted as “SimpleFusion”).
Other experimental settings are the same as the settings of the digital-world attack. The
visualization of them can be found in Fig.6(a). We train 6 adversarial patches with all
the same experimental settings except for the initialization. The corresponding accu-
racy after attacking are 17.67%, 18.96%, 16.11%, 21,10%, 24.09%, 5.42%. It shows
that our fused priors offer adversarial patches the strongest attacking ability.
Decision Boundary Distance Analysis The minimum distance to the decision bound-
ary among the data points reflects the model robustness to small noises [2]. Similarly,
the distance to decision boundaries for an instance characterizes the feasibility perform-
ing attack from it. Due to the computation difficulty of decision boundary distance for
(a) Different Priors (b) Boundary Distance
Fig. 6. (a) shows different priors we used to generate adversarial patches. They are white patch,
Gaussian noise, hard example, PD-UA, simple fusion, and our textural prior respectively, from
up to down, left to right. (b) is the decision boundary distance analysis, where our fused prior
achieves the smallest decision boundary distances for each class
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deep models, we calculate the distance of an instance x to specified classes w.r.t. the
model prediction to represent the decision boundary distance. Given a learnt model F
and point xi with class label yi (i = 1, . . . , N ), for each direction (yj ,i 6= j) we esti-
mate the smallest step numbers moved as the distance. We use the L2 norm Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) until the model’s prediction changes, i.e., F (xi) 6= yi.
As shown in Fig.6(b), our textural priors obtain the minimum distance in each di-
rection compared to other initialization strategies. It explains the reason that our textu-
ral prior performs stronger adversarial attacks because it is more close to the decision
boundaries.
4.7 Ablation Study
In this section, we investigate our method through ablation study.
The Effectiveness of Class Prototypes In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness
of the prototypes using ResNet-152. We first study it by using different amounts of pro-
totypes. Specifically, we mix class prototypes and item images from the RPC dataset
in different ratios. We use them to train different adversarial patches and assess their
attacking ability. Note that the total number of the training data is fixed as 1000. As
shown in Table 4, with the increasing number of prototypes, adversarial patches be-
coming stronger (i.e., lower accuracy).
Besides, we further investigate the amount of data required with our framework
to train adversarial patches by solely using prototypes or item images, respectively.
Specifically, we first train adversarial patches with 1000 prototypes as OursP1000. Then,
we randomly select 1000, 2000, 4000, 10000 item images from the RPC dataset to
train adversarial patches, respectively (denoted by OursI1000, OursI2000, OursI4000,
and OursI10000). The results in Table 3 show that to achieve the approximate attack-
ing ability in OursP1000 setting, a lot more items images are required. It indicates the
representative ability of class prototypes for different classes. Thus, we can conclude
that our class prototypes are beneficial to improve the attack ability and reduce the
amount of training data required.
Table 3. The top-1 accuracy of the adversarial patches obtained using different amount of training
data. To achieve the approximate attacking ability, a lot more items images are required compared
to prototypes.
Settings OursP1000 OursI1000 OursI2000 OursI4000 OursI10000
top-1 6.51 12.43 6.57 6.10 5.40
Transformation Module Studies have shown that adversarial examples are ineffective
to environmental conditions, e.g., different rotations, illuminations, etc. In the ACO sce-
nario, items are often scanned from different views with different lighting conditions.
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Table 4. Training with a different mixture
of class prototypes and original item images
using the same amount of training data. Ob-
viously, training with class prototypes give
adversarial patches with the strongest attack
ability.
Mixture settings top-1
(#Prototypes : #Item images)
1000 : 0 6.51
750 : 250 7.81
500 : 500 10.03
250 : 750 11.55
0 : 1000 12.43
Table 5. Ablation study on transformation
module. Note that setting w/ means the
patch is generated with transformation in
training progress, and the setting w/o is the
opposite. All of the generated patches are
tested in the digital world.
Transformation Settings top-1
Rotation
w/ 11.98
w/o 13.01
Distortion
w/ 22.26
w/o 30.70
Affine
w/ 16.38
w/o 21.10
Thus, we introduce a transformation module to reduce the impact of environmental
conditions to the the attack ability. Here, we study the effectiveness of different trans-
formation types we used in the module. Specifically, we employ ResNet-152 as the tar-
get model and execute only one kind of transformation in each experiment. As shown
in Table 5, enabling transformations would increase attacking ability in ACO scenario
with lower accuracy (i.e.,11.98% to 13.01% in rotation setting, 22.26% to 30.70% in
distortion setting, 16.38% to 21.10% in affine setting).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a bias-based attack framework to generate class-agnostic
universal adversarial patches, which exploits both the perceptual and semantic bias of
models. Regarding the perceptual bias, since DNNs are strongly biased towards tex-
tures, we exploit the hard examples which convey strong model uncertainties and ex-
tract a textural patch prior from them by adopting the style similarities. The patch prior
is more close to decision boundaries and would promote attacks. To further alleviate
the heavy dependency on large amounts of data in training universal attacks, we further
exploit the semantic bias. As the class-wise preference, prototypes are introduced and
pursued by maximizing the multi-class margin to help universal training. Taking ACO
as the typical scenario, extensive experiments are conducted which demonstrate that
our proposed framework outperforms state-of-the-art adversarial patch attack methods.
Since our adversarial patches could attack the ACO system, it is meaningful for
us to study how and why DNNs make wrong predictions. Our framework provides an
effective path to investigate model blind-spots. Beyond, it could also be beneficial to
improve the robustness of ACO systems in practice.
Model biases, especially texture-based features, have been used to perform adver-
sarial attacks. In contrast, we are also interested in improving model robustness from
the perspective of model bias. Can we improve model robustness by eliminating the
textural features from the training data? We leave it as future work.
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